Trespass

Trespass is an area of criminal law or tort law broadly divided into three groups: trespass to the person, trespass to chattels and trespass to land.An act which, directly or indirectly, is the legal cause of a harmful contact with another's person makes the actor liable to the other, if: Trespass is an area of criminal law or tort law broadly divided into three groups: trespass to the person, trespass to chattels and trespass to land. Trespass to the person historically involved six separate trespasses: threats, assault, battery, wounding, mayhem (or maiming), and false imprisonment. Through the evolution of the common law in various jurisdictions, and the codification of common law torts, most jurisdictions now broadly recognize three trespasses to the person: assault, which is 'any act of such a nature as to excite an apprehension of battery'; battery, 'any intentional and unpermitted contact with the plaintiff's person or anything attached to it and practically identified with it'; and false imprisonment, the 'unlaw obstruct or depriv of freedom from restraint of movement'. One can Retrieve wounded or expired game from neighboring properties and boundaries even if the neighboring land owner does not give permission as long as there are no weapons in possession while retrieving game caus injury'. Trespass to chattel does not require a showing of damages. Simply the 'intermeddling with or use of … the personal property' of another gives cause of action for trespass. Since CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., various courts have applied the principles of trespass to chattel to resolve cases involving unsolicited bulk e-mail and unauthorized server usage. Trespass to land is today the tort most commonly associated with the term trespass; it takes the form of 'wrongful interference with one's possessory rights in property'. Generally, it is not necessary to prove harm to a possessor's legally protected interest; liability for unintentional trespass varies by jurisdiction. 't common law, every unauthorized entry upon the soil of another was a trespasser'; however, under the tort scheme established by the Restatement of Torts, liability for unintentional intrusions arises only under circumstances evincing negligence or where the intrusion involved a highly dangerous activity. Trespass has also been treated as a common law offense in some countries. There are three types of trespass, the first of which is trespass to the person. Whether intent is a necessary element of trespass to the person varies by jurisdiction. Under English decision, Letang v Cooper, intent is required to sustain a trespass to the person cause of action; in the absence of intent, negligence is the appropriate tort. In other jurisdictions, gross negligence is sufficient to sustain a trespass to the person, such as when a defendant negligently operates an automobile and strikes the plaintiff with great force. 'Intent is to be presumed from the act itself.' Generally, trespass to the person consists of three torts: assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Under the statutes of various common law jurisdictions, assault is both a crime and a tort. Generally, a person commits criminal assault if he purposely, knowingly, or recklessly inflicts bodily injury upon another; if he negligently inflicts bodily injury upon another by means of dangerous weapon; or if through physical menace, he places another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. A person commits tortious assault when he engages in 'any act of such a nature as to excite an apprehension of battery '. In some jurisdictions, there is no requirement that actual physical violence result—simply the 'threat of unwanted touching of the victim' suffices to sustain an assault claim. Consequently, in R v Constanza, the court found a stalker's threats could constitute assault. Similarly, silence, given certain conditions, may constitute an assault as well. However, in other jurisdictions, simple threats are insufficient; they must be accompanied by an action or condition to trigger a cause of action. Incongruity of a defendant's language and action, or of a plaintiff's perception and reality may vitiate an assault claim. In Tuberville v Savage, the defendant reached for his sword and told the plaintiff that 'f it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you'. In its American counterpart, Commonwealth v. Eyre, the defendant shouted 'f it were not for your gray hairs, I would tear your heart out'. In both cases, the courts held that despite a threatening gesture, the plaintiffs were not in immediate danger. The actions must give the plaintiff a reasonable expectation that the defendant is going to use violence; a fist raised before the plaintiff may suffice; the same fist raised behind the window of a police cruiser will not. Battery is 'any intentional and unpermitted contact with the plaintiff's person or anything attached to it and practically identified with it'. The elements of battery common law varies by jurisdiction. In the United States, the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts provides a general rule to determine liability for battery: Battery torts under Commonwealth precedent are subjected to a four point test to determine liability: