Law of the sea

Law of the Sea is a body of international law governing the rights and duties of states in maritime environments. It concerns matters such as navigational rights, sea mineral claims, and coastal waters jurisdiction. The air belongs to this class of things for two reasons. First, it is not susceptible of occupation; and second its common use is destined for all men. For the same reasons the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries. Law of the Sea is a body of international law governing the rights and duties of states in maritime environments. It concerns matters such as navigational rights, sea mineral claims, and coastal waters jurisdiction. While drawn from a number of international customs, treaties, and agreements, modern law of the sea derives largely from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), effective since 1994, which is generally accepted as a codification of customary international law of the sea, and is sometimes regarded as the 'constitution of the oceans'. Law of the sea is the public law counterpart to admiralty law (also known as maritime law), which applies to private maritime issues, such as the carriage of goods by sea, rights of salvage, ship collisions, and marine insurance. Among the earliest examples of legal codes concerning maritime affairs is the Byzantine Lex Rhodia, promulgated between 600 and 800 C.E. to govern trade and navigation in the Mediterranean. Maritime law codes were also created during the European Middle Ages, such as the Rolls of Oléron, which drew from Lex Rhodia, and the Laws of Wisby, enacted among the mercantile city-states of the Hanseatic League. However, the earliest known formulation of public international law of the sea was in 17th century Europe, which saw unprecedented navigation, exploration, and trade across the world's oceans. Portugal and Spain led this trend, staking claims over both the land and sea routes they discovered. Spain considered the Pacific Ocean a mare clausum—literally a 'closed sea' off limits to other naval powers—in part to protect its possessions in Asia. Similarly, as the only known entrance from the Atlantic, the Strait of Magellan was periodically patrolled by Spanish fleets to prevent entrance by foreign vessels. The papal bull Romanus Pontifex (1455) recognized Portugal's exclusive right to navigation, trade, and fishing in the seas near discovered land, and on this basis the Portuguese claimed a monopoly on East Indian trade, prompting opposition and conflict from other European naval powers. Amid growing competition over sea trade, Dutch jurist and philosopher Hugo Grotius—considered the father of international law generally—wrote Mare Liberum (The Freedom of the Seas), published in 1609, which set forth the principle that the sea was international territory and that all nations were thus free to use it for trade. He premised this argument on the idea that 'every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it.' Thus, there was a right to innocent passage over land and a similar right of innocent passage at sea. Grotius observed that unlike land, on which sovereigns could demarcate their jurisdiction, the sea was akin to air, a common property of all: Writing in response to Grotius, the English jurist John Selden argued in Mare Clausum that the sea was as capable of appropriation by sovereign powers as terrestrial territory. Rejecting Grotius' premise, Selden claimed there was no historical basis for the sea to be treated differently than land, nor was there anything inherent in the nature of the sea that precluded states from exercising dominion over parts of it. In essence, international law could evolve to accommodate the emerging framework of national jurisdiction over the sea. As a growing number of nations began to expand their naval presence across the world, conflicting claims over the open sea mounted. This prompted maritime states to moderate their stance and to limit the extent of their jurisdiction towards the sea from land. This was aided by the compromise position presented by Dutch legal theorist Cornelius Bynkershoek, who in De dominio maris (1702), established the principle that maritime dominion was limited to the distance within which cannons could effectively protect it. Grotius' concept of 'freedom of the seas' became virtually universal through the 20th century, following the global dominance of European naval powers. National rights and jurisdiction over the seas were limited to a specified belt of water extending from a nation's coastlines, usually three nautical miles (5.6 km), according to Bynkershoek's 'cannon shot' rule. Under the mare liberum principle, all waters beyond national boundaries were considered international waters: Free to all nations, but belonging to none of them.