Stop in the name of lies: The cost of blocking the truth to deceive

Abstract Most researchers assume that deceptioninvolves a conflict between a predominant truth response and a deliberate deceptiveresponse. Such a view is consistent with dual process theoriesthat state that high- ordercognition operatesthrough fast-automatic processes that may conflict with slow- deliberateones. In the present study, we tested whether one must inhibit the truth to deceive in light of inconsistent findings in the literature. One hundred and eighty-nine participants were tested across two Negative Primingparadigms that rest on the logic that the activation of a fast-automatic process will be hampered on a given display if it is inhibited on the previous display. Our findings suggest that truthful responses are predominant in healthy adults, which is why inhibitory controlis required to activate a deliberate deceptivemode. We argue that the findings from deceptionstudies could be best accounted for by dual process theories.