A tale of two tails: Preferences of neutral third-parties in three-player ultimatum games

We present a three-player game in which a proposer makes a suggestion on how to split $10 with a passive responder. The oer is accepted or rejected depending on the strategy prole of a neutral third-party whose payos are independent from his decisions. If the oer is accepted the split takes place as suggested, if rejected, then both proposer and receiver get $0. Our results show a decision-maker whose main concern is to reduce the inequality between proposer and responder and who, in order to do so, is willing to reject both selsh and generous oers.This pattern of rejections is robust through a series of treatments which include changing the at-fee payo of the decision-maker, introducing a monetary cost for the decision-maker in case the oer ends up in a rejection, or letting a computer replace the proposer to randomly make the splitting suggestion between proposer and responder. Further, through these dierent treatments we are able to show that decision- makers ignore the intentions behind the proposers suggestions, as well as ignoring their own relative payos, two surprising results given the existing literature.