Striking Differences : How to Explain Labor Disputes

The point of departure for this thesis is the divergent fate of organized labor during the last decades in the Western world. Given what we know about actual trends, how are we to explain the variation in the strength of organized labor across time and space? The thesis consists of four self-contained essays.Essay 1: Using aggregate datafrom 15 advanced capitalist societies, I show that the estimated effects of domestic cyclical, labor market structural, and globalization variablesdiffer in a predictable manner across nation-specific institutional frameworks.Essay 2: In the second essay I argue that two institutional properties – the degree of centralization in the bargaining system and the workplace access of the union movement – will interactively influence the unionization process. The empirical results indicate that these institutional variables positively influence the aggregate density levels and cushion the effects of compositional factors on the probability of being a union member.Essay 3: In the third essay I argue that coordinated wage bargaining alters the causal logic when explaining wage inequality, in the sense that common explanatory factors have different effects depending on the degree of bargaining coordination. The evidence presented supports the theoretical argument.Essay 4: In this essay I propose a formal model of strike behavior predicting a curvilinear relationship between employer beliefs about union bargaining strength and the probability of a strike. Further, I argue that this curvilinear relationship is valid only under uncoordinated wage bargaining.